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LEDWABA 2013 11 BLLR 1137 (LC) 
T Cohen 
1 Introduction 
The labour unrest and strike violence that has brutalised the South African labour 
market in recent times can be attributed, in part, to inter-union rivalry.1 Minority 
unions, seeking to stake their claim in a sector or business, have declared "turf-war" 
against majority unions – with this often escalating into loss of life,2 damage to 
property, and dire economic consequences. This labour unrest have had both local 
and global repercussions, which is evidenced in a weakened currency, reduced 
global investment, declining productivity, and increasing unemployment rates in the 
sectors affected.3 The condition of the mining sector – ravaged by inter-union rivalry 
between the minority union Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union 
(AMCU) and the majority union National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) – bears 
testament to these effects.4 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) 
guarantees freedom of association, the rights of employees to form and join trade 
unions and to strike, and the rights of trade unions, employers and employers' 
                                        
  Tamara Cohen. BA LLB LLM (UND), PhD (UKZN). Associate Professor, School of Law, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. Email: tamdav@iafrica.com. 
1  See Ngcukaitobi 2013 ILJ 836. 
2  During August-September 2012 44 people died due to strike-related violence at Lonmin's 
Marikana mine – including 34 people killed by police in a single day. The South African Institute 
of Race Relations reports that between January 1999 and October 2012 181 people have died in 
strike violence, 313 people were injured, and over 3058 were arrested (see Windgrin 2013 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29097:nearly-
200-killed-in-strike-action-in-13-years-sairr&catid=3:Civil+Security&Itemid=113). 
3  In the mining sector, mining production dropped 4.5% (R12 billion) between June 2012 and 
March 2013 – resulting in a negative impact on South Africa's GDP and currency depreciation. In 
2013, the Fraser Institute downgraded South Africa to 64th out of 96 countries in respect of 
investor friendliness (see Leon 2013 http://politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/ 
page71619?oid=427549&sn=Detail&pid=71616). 
4  In the platinum sector, labour stoppages since late 2012 have cost the sector approximately R18 
billion in lost revenue and 900 000 oz in lost output. The ongoing strikes in early 2014 at Implats 
are estimated to be costing the mine R400 million per day in lost revenue (see Burkhardt 2014 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-04-platinum-pay-strike-costs-south-africa-36-million-a-day). 
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organisations to bargain collectively.5 In furtherance of these objectives, the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) provides a regulatory framework for collective 
bargaining and organisational rights – in keeping with international and 
constitutional obligations. Trade unions are the vehicles for effective collective 
bargaining, while the LRA unequivocally promotes the policy choice of 
majoritarianism.6 The Labour Appeal Court in Kem-Lin Fashions CC v Brunton7 
explains the majoritarian principle as being that: 
the will of the majority should prevail over that of the minority. This is good for 
orderly collective bargaining as well as for the democratization of the workplace and 
sectors … a proliferation of trade unions in one workplace or in a sector should be 
discouraged. 
In keeping with these objectives, section 21(8)(a)(i) of the LRA directs 
commissioners, in resolving recognition disputes, to: 
seek to minimise the proliferation of trade union representation in a single 
workplace, and where possible, to encourage a system of a representative trade 
union in a workplace. 
"Sufficiently representative" unions are afforded organisational rights which regulate 
access to the workplace,8 stop-order facilities,9 and time off for union activities.10 
Majority unions representative of the majority of workers at a workplace are 
provided with further entitlements in the form of the recognition of shop stewards11 
and the disclosure of information.12 Furthermore, section 18(1) of the LRA enables 
majority unions to enter into collective agreements setting thresholds of 
representivity for the granting of access, stop-order and trade-union leave rights to 
minority unions.13 Brassey 14 explains the object of this provision as being: 
                                        
5   Ss 18 and 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6  See ss 14(1); 16(1); 18(1); 25(1), (2); 26(1), (2); 32(1)(a), (b); 32(3)(a), (b), (c), (d); 32(5); 
78(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
7  Kem-Lin Fashions CC v Brunton 2001 22 ILJ 109 (LAC) 
8  S 12 of the LRA. 
9  S 13 of the LRA. 
10  S 15 of the LRA. 
11  S 14 of the LRA. 
12  S 16 of the LRA. 
13  A collective agreement concluded in terms of s 18(1) is not binding unless the thresholds of 
representativeness are applied equally to any registered trade union seeking these organisational 
rights. 
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to enable the parties to put a numerical figure to the otherwise somewhat 
indeterminate concept of 'sufficiently representative' for which the stipulated 
sections (12, 13 and 15) provide. But the primary object of the section is to 
promote workplace majoritarianism, that is, the system under which a single union 
or group of unions enjoy exclusive rights or representation within a workplace ... 
In furtherance of the majoritarian framework, collective agreements concluded 
between majority unions and employers can be extended to non-parties to the 
agreement in terms of section 23(1)(d) of the LRA – provided specified requirements 
are satisfied.15 
In Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union v Ledwaba16 (hereafter POPCRU) the Labour 
Court was required to consider whether collective agreements concluded between 
the employer and the majority union Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) 
were binding on the minority union – SA Correctional Services Workers Union 
(SACOSWU). The court was required to consider further whether the extension of 
such collective agreements to SACOSWU could be relied upon by POPCRU to prohibit 
SACOSWU from securing organisational rights. In so doing, the Labour Court had to 
reconcile the fundamental principle of freedom of association and the right to fair 
labour practices (to organise and engage in unfettered collective bargaining) within 
the context of the majoritarian framework created by the LRA. 
2 The facts 
The employer in this matter, the Department of Correctional Services (the 
Department), operates in terms of a formal and agreed bargaining and dispute-
resolution structure composed of two bargaining councils and a central bargaining 
forum – the Departmental Bargaining Chamber (DBC) – in which collective 
bargaining is conducted. While POPCRU, as a majority union, was a member of 
                                                                                                                          
14  Brassey Commentary on the Labour Relations Act A3-23–24. Referred to with approval in United 
Association of SA v BHP Billiton Energy Coal SA Ltd 2013 34 ILJ 2118 (LC), in which the court 
noted that "given the nature of s 18 and the agreements flowing from it, it is, of course, 
ordinarily permissible for the parties to a threshold agreement to enter into a new agreement or 
amend the existing agreement and, in so doing, increase the threshold for the grant of 
organizational rights". 
15  The provision requires such employees to be identified in the agreement, the agreement to 
expressly bind them, and it must be concluded by union/unions that have, as members, a 
majority of employees at the workplace. 
16  Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union v Ledwaba 2013 11 BLLR 1137 (LC) (hereafter POPCRU). 
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these bargaining structures, the minority union SACOSWU was not, despite all of its 
members falling under the scope and jurisdiction of the DBC as employees of the 
Department. In terms of a series of resolutions concluded between POPCRU and the 
Department between 2001 and 2006, the thresholds of representativeness for entry 
into the DBC17 and organisational rights18 were agreed upon. The application of 
these agreements was extended to all employees of the Department in terms of 
section 23(1)(d), regardless of whether they were POPCRU members or not. In 2010 
SACOSWU concluded a collective agreement with the Department in terms of which 
it secured itself organisational rights, despite having acquired neither the threshold 
of representativeness nor having been admitted to the DBC. POPCRU challenged this 
agreement, alleging that it was in breach of the pre-existing and binding collective 
agreements with the Department. 
The bargaining council arbitrator held that the collective agreement between the 
Department and SACOSWU had been validly concluded in terms of section 20 of the 
LRA and, in keeping with the finding of the Constitutional Court in National Union of 
Mineworkers v Bader Bop (hereafter Bader Bop),19 it was binding on the parties.20 
The Bader Bop judgment recognised that a minority union can lawfully strike or 
conclude an agreement to secure organisational rights in circumstances where they 
do not meet the statutory threshold.21 The arbitrator in POPCRU held that to deny 
the minority union such rights would contravene section 23(5) of the Constitution, 
which provides that every trade union has the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. 
                                        
17  Adoption of the public service job summit framework agreement signed in Pietersburg, 
Resolution 7 of 2001 available at Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council date unknown 
http://www.pscbc.org.za/?page_id=2568. 
18  Disciplinary Code and Procedure for the Department of Correctional Services Resolution 1 of 
2006 available at General Public Service: Sectoral Bargaining Council 2006 
http://www.gpssbc.org.za/resolutions/2006/Resolution%201%20of%202006%20DCS%20Discipli
nary%20Code%20and%20Procedure.pdf. Procedure manual regulating relations between the 
department of correctional services and unions admitted to the departmental bargaining 
chamber Resolution 3 of 2006. 
19  National Union of Mineworkers v Bader Bop 2003 24 ILJ 305 (CC) (hereafter Bader Bop). 
20  GPBC1754/2011 and GPBC1754/2011 (16 Feb 2012). 
21  Bader Bop para 40. 
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3 The finding of the Labour Court 
On review, the Labour Court was required to consider if the agreement conferring 
organisational rights on SACOSWU conflicted with the collective agreements 
concluded between POPCRU and the Department, and if it was therefore invalid and 
unenforceable. 
In keeping with the ethos of voluntarism and in the absence of a duty to bargain,22 
the LRA makes provision for collective bargaining between "sufficiently 
representative" unions and the employers.23 The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal24 
expressly notes that collective agreements should be given primacy over provisions 
of the LRA – in keeping with the primary purpose of the LRA, which is to promote 
orderly collective bargaining.25 In terms of section 23 of the LRA, a collective 
agreement is binding on the parties to the agreement – and also on non-parties to 
the agreement – provided that such employees are identified in the agreement,26 the 
agreement expressly binds them, and the agreement is concluded by a union or 
unions that have as members a majority of employees at the workplace.27 
The right to strike is an integral part of the collective bargaining process and, as 
noted by the Court in Bader Bop, is fundamental to effective collective bargaining. In 
Bader Bop the Constitutional Court was satisfied that section 23(2)(c) of the 
Constitution and section 64(1) of the LRA (that confers upon every worker the right 
to strike) could be read to extend the right to strike to minority unions seeking to 
obtain organisational rights in circumstances when they were not sufficiently 
                                        
22   SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2006 27 ILJ 2276 (SCA) para 25; National 
Union of Mineworkers v Eskom Holdings Soc Ltd 2012 33 ILJ 669 (LC) para 24; SA Municipal 
Workers Union v SA Local Government Association 2010 31 ILJ 2178 (LC) para 16. See, also, 
Ministerial Task Team 1995 ILJ 293.  
23  Organisational rights are regulated by Part A and B of Chapter 111 of the LRA, and the right to 
strike is regulated by Chapter IV of the Act. 
24  Item 1.2. 
25  S 1(d) of the LRA. 
26  The requirement of identification is satisfied by reference to general categories of workers – as 
opposed to specified employees. In casu, the collective agreements concluded with POPCRU 
expressly bound all employees in the Departmental Bargaining Unit and extended the application 
of such agreement to all employees at the workplace.   
27  S 23(1)(d). See, also, Aunde South Africa (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 2011 10 BLLR 945 (LAC); Mzeku v 
Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 8 BLLR 857 (LAC); Fakude v Kwikot (Pty) Ltd 2013 34 ILJ 2024 
(LC).  
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representative, and thus not legally entitled to such rights. Nonetheless, section 
65(3)(a) of the LRA clearly states that the right to strike is prohibited where the 
issue in dispute is regulated by a collective agreement – in keeping with the 
legislative purpose of prohibiting strikes over rights' disputes and minimising the 
incidence of strikes. 
The facts revealed that in POPCRU – unlike in Bader Bop28 – the minority union was 
bound by the collective agreements concluded with the majority union, which fully 
"regulated"29 the organisational rights in dispute and the thresholds of 
representativeness. The Labour Court was accordingly of the view that, as an 
existing collective agreement regulated the issue in dispute, SACOSWU would have 
been prohibited from striking to secure organisational rights in terms of section 
65(3) of the LRA. On this basis, and in a strange twist of logic, the Court noted that 
in the absence of the right to strike and in the light of the "inextricable relationship 
between collective bargaining and the right to strike",30 there was "no point to 
collective bargaining on the issue"31 and the parties were thus "not entitled to 
collectively bargain on the same".32 More logical was the court's finding that 
collective bargaining between SACOSWU and the employer on organisational rights – 
when such issues were comprehensively regulated by a pre-existing and binding 
collective agreement with POPCRU – was not a "legitimate labour issue"33 and a 
strike in furtherance of such a right constitutes an "unlawful demand".34 On this 
basis, the court in POPCRU was satisfied that the arbitrator's reliance on the dictum 
of the court in Bader Bop was misplaced, and was not binding in the circumstances. 
In reaching its decision, the court held that a collective agreement concluded with a 
majority trade union: 
                                        
28  In Bader Bop the minority union was not bound by the collective agreement concluded with the 
majority union. 
29  The court in POPCRU, relying on the dictum of the court in Air Chefs (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport 
and Allied Workers Union 2013 34 ILJ 119 (LC) para 27, noted that an issue is "regulated" where 
contained in a substantive rule, or if the process for dealing with the issue is regulated in the 
agreement. 
30  POPCRU 1153. 
31  POPCRU 1153. 
32  POPCRU 1153. 
33  POPCRU 1153. 
34  POPCRU 1154. 
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that regulates or even excludes organisational rights of minority trade unions in the 
particular employer, must have preference over the organisational rights such 
minority union may be entitled to in terms of the Constitution or the LRA. 
Organisational rights must have a purpose and no such purpose can be achieved by 
affording organisational rights to a minority trade union where an employer and a 
majority trade union have already fully regulated all their affairs relating to their 
relationship, and the structure of collective bargaining, in a collective agreement 
made binding on all the employees in the employer. To simply afford organisational 
rights without a purpose or reason would make organisational rights an end in itself 
and not a means to an end, which is not what is intended by the LRA.
35
 
The Court proceeded to consider whether – in spite of this finding – section 20 of 
the LRA enabled SACOSWU to validly conclude a collective agreement on 
organisational rights through collective bargaining. Section 20 clearly stipulates that 
nothing in Part A of Chapter III "precludes the conclusion of a collective agreement 
that regulates organisational rights". In Bader Bop the court confirmed that, in terms 
of section 20, unrepresentative unions are entitled to bargain for organisational 
rights outside of the parameters of Part A of Chapter III. A valid collective 
agreement can therefore be concluded and will be subject to the provisions 
governing collective agreements in Part B of Chapter III of the LRA – irrespective of 
whether the union is representative or not. The facts in POPCRU revealed that the 
agreement concluded in 2001 between POPCRU and the Department in terms of 
section 18(1) set the representivity threshold at 9 000 members per trade union – 
making the attainment of such a threshold a prerequisite for admission to the DBC. 
Organisational rights, made contingent upon admission to the DBC, were regulated 
by a collective agreement.36 More importantly, the court was satisfied that the 
application of these agreements had been lawfully extended to SACOSWU 
members.37 As SACOSWU had a membership of 2 000 employees and could not 
comply with the threshold – nor could it gain access to the DBC and concomitant 
organisational rights – the agreement concluded with SACOSWU was in conflict with 
the pre-existing dispensation. 
                                        
35 POPCRU 1149.  
36  Concluded in 2006. 
37  See, also, Bravo Group Sleep Products (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied 
Workers Union 2009 30 ILJ 1090 (LC). 
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The court was satisfied that a "collective agreement hierarchy"38 should apply in a 
situation where a collective agreement concluded with a majority union is 
incompatible or conflicts with an agreement concluded with a minority union. In 
such a situation, the court held, the agreement concluded with the majority must 
take preference – in keeping with the interests of orderly collective bargaining and 
the principle of majoritarianism. The review was accordingly granted, and the 
collective agreement concluded with SACOSWU was declared invalid and set aside. 
4 Reconciling sections 18 and 20 of the LRA 
This decision raises the important issue of the apparent conflict between sections 18 
and 20 of the LRA. A literal interpretation of the two provisions suggests that they 
can co-exist, with section 20 unequivocally stipulating that: 
[n]othing in this Part precludes the conclusion of a collective agreement that 
regulates organisational rights. 
Nonetheless, a purposive interpretation in keeping with the ethos of majoritarianism 
and the legislative purpose of orderly collective bargaining reveals that a collective 
agreement concluded by a minority union in breach of the thresholds set by section 
18 undermines the fundamental purpose of the provision.39 Judge Ngcobo,40 
delivering a separate concurring judgment in Bader Bop, noted that section 20 
permits both: 
unrepresentative and representative unions to conclude collective agreements to 
regulate organizational rights outside of part A
41
 ... provided such agreement does 
not prevent the exercise of statutory organisational rights by registered unions. 
It can be argued that a majority union's statutory right to enjoy organisational rights 
– unfettered by a proliferation of unrepresentative trade unions at a workplace – will 
indeed be infringed by the extension of organisational rights to minority unions that 
do not meet the agreed threshold for representivity. To enforce the section 20 
                                        
38  POPCRU 1163. 
39  S 18 of the LRA has been criticised as supporting a cabal of sweetheart unions and their 
employers, and for undermining the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and the 
right to engage in collective bargaining. In this regard, see Kruger and Tshoose 2013 PER/PELJ 
285.  
40 Bader Bop 334. 
41  Bader Bop 336. 
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agreement concluded with SACOSWU, would, as the court held in POPCRU, "fly in 
the face of sections 18(1) and 23(1) of the LRA".42 
In keeping with this approach, the Labour Court in Chamber of Mines of SA acting in 
its own name & on behalf of Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd v Association of 
Mineworkers & Construction Union43 recently granted an interim interdict prohibiting 
the minority union AMCU from striking over a wage dispute – finding that: 
the majoritarian principle should accordingly carry the day in a democratic collective 
bargaining exercise. 
The basis for the application was that AMCU members were bound by a collective 
agreement which regulated wages and other terms and conditions of employment 
entered into between the employer's organisation, the Chamber of Mines, on behalf 
of its members, and the majority unions at the workplace. Judge Cele was satisfied 
that the wage agreement concluded by the Chamber of Mines had been extended in 
terms of section 23(1)(d) to AMCU members on a "per employer basis" and 
expressly prohibited a strike by those bound by the agreement. Importantly, Judge 
Cele44 noted that: 
The constitutional right of employees to strike in this matter must not be seen in 
isolation from the right of the members of NUM, Solidarity and UASA to collectively 
bargain with their employers. Accepting that NUM, Solidarity and UASA represented 
the majority of the employees in the workplace, it would be constitutional to allow 
the democratic process of the majoritarian representation to prevail. If the minority 
employees represented at the workplace by AMCU were to succeed and have a new 
wage agreement to come about and to supplant the existing collective agreement, 
the minorities would be governing for the majority in the workplace. That result is 
certainly undesirable.  
On the return date of the rule nisi,45 Judge Van Niekerk, in considering AMCU's 
counter-application challenging the constitutionality of section 23(1)(d), held that the 
limitation posed to the right to strike was justifiable and consistent with the 
                                        
42  POPCRU 1165.  
43  Chamber of Mines of SA v Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union 2014 35 ILJ 1243 
(LC). 
44  Chamber of Mines of SA v Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union 2014 35 ILJ 1243 
(LC). 
45  Chamber of Mines of SA v Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union 2014 ZALCJHB 223 
(23 June 2014) para 69 (hereafter Chamber of Mines). 
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legislative scheme applicable to collective bargaining. He noted that the majoritarian 
principle: 
promotes orderly collective bargaining, a legitimate purpose of the LRA and serves 
the legislative purpose of advancing labour peace and the democratisation of the 
workplace and the creation of a framework within which parties can bargain 
collectively to determine wages and other terms and conditions of employment. If 
an employer and unions party to a collective agreement were denied the right to 
extend their agreement to non-party employees, collective bargaining would be 
characterised by opportunism and the attendant threat to the formation of stable 
relationships.
46
 
The conflict between sections 18 and 20 was again addressed by the Labour Court in 
Transnet Soc Ltd v National Transport Movement (hereafter Transnet).47 Judge Van 
Niekerk considered whether or not a strike by a minority union to secure 
organisational rights was unprotected – in that it sought to compel the employer to 
perform the "unlawful act" of breaching a pre-existing and binding collective 
agreement with majority unions. In this matter the applicant, Transnet, had 
concluded a recognition agreement with a number of trade unions at the workplace, 
in terms of which thresholds of recognition were fixed for the attainment of 
organisational rights. Organisational rights were reserved for those unions that were 
deemed to be sufficiently representative – in that they represented a minimum of 
30% of the employees at the workplace. The respondent, Transnet Soc Ltd – a 
minority union – sought to obtain organisational rights by means of strike action, 
despite falling well below the required threshold. The applicants argued that the 
collective agreement regulated the basis upon which organisational rights could be 
attained, and as the respondent did not meet the threshold requirements for 
organisational rights a demand for such entitlement would constitute a breach of the 
agreement. Judge Van Niekerk,48 in determining the matter and without making 
reference to the finding of the court in POPCRU, noted that: 
[w]hether a collective agreement concluded between an employer and third party 
unions may limit the right to strike by a non-party union, in my view, is a question 
that must be answered by the terms of the agreement, read with section 64 and 
section 65 of the Act. 
                                        
46  Chamber of Mines para 69. 
47  Transnet Soc Ltd v National Transport Movement 2014 1 BLLR 98 (LC) (hereafter Transnet). 
48  Transnet 103. 
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Judge Van Niekerk was satisfied, on the facts, that the collective agreement 
regulated the organisational rights of the parties to the agreement, and did not 
appear to have been extended to bind those employees that were not members of 
any of the union-parties to the collective agreement.49 As the minority union was not 
a party to the collective agreement (unlike in the POPCRU matter), the court was 
satisfied that it was not bound by the terms of the agreement, and that it was 
entitled to strike. In this regard, the finding of the court was consistent with the ratio 
of the court in POPCRU. 
In considering if section 18 of the LRA could be relied upon to limit the right of 
minority unions to strike, Judge Van Niekerk – in Transnet – was of the view that the 
provision contemplates an agreement between a single majority trade union and the 
employer – unlike sections 14(1) and 16(1), that permit "one or more" unions to act 
jointly to constitute a majority. As the collective agreement had been concluded 
between the employer and four trade unions, the court believed that it was not an 
agreement contemplated by section 18, and did not serve to bind the minority 
union. However, Judge Van Niekerk proceeded to find, albeit obiter, that even if 
section 18 permitted agreements between an employer and two or more minority 
unions acting jointly, there is no express limitation in sections 64 and 65 which 
prevents: 
a minority union demanding those rights from seeking to bargain collectively to 
acquire them, or from exercising its right to strike should the employer resist the 
demand.
50
 
Judge Van Niekerk concluded that a correct interpretation – in keeping with 
international labour standards and constitutional protections – was that neither 
section 18 nor the terms of the collective agreement precluded the minority union 
from bargaining collectively or striking to secure organisational rights in the 
circumstances. In this regard, the court's view differed fundamentally from that in 
POPCRU. 
                                        
49  Transnet 103. 
50  Transnet 104. 
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5 Analysis 
The fundamental principle of freedom of association and the right to engage in 
collective bargaining is enshrined in international instruments like the International 
Labour Organisation Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention (1948) (No 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention (1949) (No 98) – both ratified by South Africa on 19 February 1996.51 
The two key supervisory bodies responsible for the implementation of these 
Conventions are the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, and the Committee on Freedom of Association.52 The position of 
the Committee of Experts is that the majoritarian system is compatible with freedom 
of association, and that a trade union which represents the majority, or a high 
percentage of the workers, in a bargaining unit may enjoy preferential or exclusive 
bargaining rights.53 Such a system, according to the Committee of Experts, must 
not, however, prevent minority unions from functioning, making representations on 
behalf of their members, and representing members in individual grievance 
disputes.54 In a similar vein, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association 
and fair labour practices can be lawfully restricted in accordance with the limitation 
clause – where such a limitation is "reasonable and justifiable".55 Closed shop and 
agency shop agreements – concluded in compliance with sections 25 and 26 of the 
LRA – are examples of such a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right to 
freedom of association, as are legislative provisions restricting organisational rights 
to majority unions.56 
 
                                        
51  Freedom of Association 2006 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/normes/ 
documents/publication/wcms_090632.pdf.  
52  Adams 2000 http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/StrikeSymposium09_ 
 Adams_fraser.pdf. 
53  Gernogon, Odero and Guido 2000 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_087931.pdf. 
54  See ILO Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles para 829. 
55  S 36(1) of the Constitution provides that the " ... rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including- (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose". 
56  Ss 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA. See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 192.  
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While the finding of the Labour Court in POPCRU is correct on the facts, and is in 
keeping with the legislative choice of majoritarianism, questions have been raised 
about the suitability of this legislative model in the current South African labour 
context. As Kahn57 (Director of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)) notes: 
This winner-takes-all approach was developed and adopted when there was a fair 
degree of union stability, a growing consolidation within the trade union movement, 
and a strong commitment to social dialogue and inclusive solutions within the 
government, labour, business and civil society. But much has changed since then. 
Abject poverty, a loss of confidence in existing bargaining structures, and 
disappointed expectations have led to the alienation of unskilled and semi-skilled 
vulnerable employees from majority unions. Minority unions have taken up the 
cudgels of frustrated and disempowered employees – that have tired of the "co-
dependent comfort zone"58 that majoritarianism has engendered. The Marikana 
experience has largely been attributed to the unsuitability of the current collective 
bargaining model within the South African socio-economic and political landscape. As 
Brassey59 notes: 
Majoritarianism, the leitmotief of both industry bargaining and plant-level 
organizational rights, is too crude to give proper expression to the interests of 
minority unions, which frequently represent skilled or semi-skilled workers but, as 
the Marikana experience demonstrates, who may simply be acting on behalf of 
workers who feel alienated from the majority union. 
The Labour Relations Amendment Bill of 201260 introduces section 21(8C), which 
empowers arbitrating commissioners to extend section 12, 13 and 15 rights to 
registered union/s that do not meet the threshold of representativeness established 
by a section 18 collective agreement. The section states that such rights may be 
granted – provided that all the parties have been given an opportunity to participate 
in the arbitration proceedings, and "the trade union or trade unions acting jointly 
represent a significant interest or a substantial number of employees, in the 
                                        
57  Kahn 2012 http://www.ccma.org.za/ViewNews.asp?NID=184. 
58  Hartford 2012 http://groundup.org.za/content/mining-industry-strike-wave-what-are-causes-and-
what-are-solutions. 
59  Brassey 2013 ILJ 834. 
60  Labour Relations Amendment Bill B16 of 2012. 
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workplace".61 This provision clearly seeks to prevent an abuse of section 18 
agreements, by providing minority unions that represent a "significant interest" or 
"sufficient number of employees" at the workplace with a right to challenge unfair or 
unreasonable threshold agreements at arbitration.62 
6 Conclusion 
The purpose of section 18 of the LRA is explained by the court in POPCRU as being: 
to regulate the admission of trade unions to the bargaining relationship with the 
employer so as to avoid a situation of proliferation by a multitude of small trade 
unions in one employer and in particular where there is already an established 
relationship with a majority trade union.
63
 
The finding of the court in POPCRU is in keeping with this intended purpose, and is 
appropriate within the context of a majoritarian regime. The purpose and intention 
of this provision is consistent with the legislative framework adopted by the drafters 
of the LRA, and is also in keeping with international conventions and the 
constitutional limitation clause. Nonetheless, the Marikana experience and the strike 
violence that has marred the South African labour market in recent times reveal the 
flaws in the majoritarian framework and the changed dynamic of the collective 
bargaining environment. 
It may be time to return to the drawing board.  
                                        
61  S 21(8D) of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill B16 of 2012. This provision is deemed to apply 
to any dispute referred to the CCMA after the commencement of the Act – irrespective of the 
date of conclusion of the s 18 agreement.  
62  As with all rights-based disputes, it is assumed that the right to strike will be excluded in such 
circumstances. That being the case, the dictum of the court in Bader Bop will not extend to 
organisational rights regulated by binding s 18 agreements. 
63  POPCRU para 46. 
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